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When the unique destiny and
fragility of British culture can
be invoked to justify anti-immigration policies or creationism
defended with a view to protecting
organic cultural variety it would
appear that something has transpired in the valence of the concept
of culture such that an earlier
oppositional content—found,
for example, in Franz Boas or
Raymond Williams and avowedly
antiracist and counterhegemonic
in tone—has been definitively
forgotten or lost. Susan Hegeman’s
new book, The Cultural Return,
takes as its object the complex associational fate of culture in an age
in which it is as much the prerogative of oppressed minorities as it
is that of majoritarian hegemony
itself. Though her analysis extends
beyond the aforementioned case,
craning (sometimes awkwardly)
across disciplines to shake out and
taxonomize the diverse connotations and usages of culture, her
general (and very useful) thesis is
that the social sciences and humanities have shelved the heuristic
value of culture at precisely the
height of its popular and political
purchase. This may, she suggests,
have significant consequences for
the way we politically model relations between past, present, and
future.
According to Hegeman, the
“repudiation of culture” is a “transdisciplinary phenomenon,” one that
stands to become, or already has,
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a full-fledged academic zeitgeist.
This is the intellectual tendency that
“best represents our current perceived moment of intellectual rupture with the recent past” (7). The
word “culture” in this formulation
functions as a shorthand for what
Fredric Jameson (among others)
has called the “cultural turn,” that
shift, first registered in the 1980s
and 1990s in the Anglo-American
academe, which saw the birth of
movement disciplines like Cultural
Studies and the New Historicism,
but which also triggered existential crises in established fields like
literary studies, art history, and
philosophy. The injunction to context enacted by the new concept
of culture—political and historical factors often methodologically
bracketed by these fields—dragged
back into the domain of everyday
practices and relations objects long
sequestered by the requirements
of disciplinary reproduction and
vanitas. This was experienced by
many working within these fields
as blunt-force personal trauma, a
displacing encounter with their
own specialized limits and competencies, but also a painful invalidation of basic disciplinary pleasure,
the love of one’s object—whether it
be literature or art—which drew so
many researchers to these fields in
the first place.
Conflict within and between
disciplines then spilled over into
highly sensationalized media narratives about the despoliation of

knowledge and art by politics;
according to evangelical church
groups and conservative pundits,
tenured atheists and feminists
were undertaking a war against
American values and against the
(cultural) civic religion required
to prevent society from devolving
into moral and economic chaos.
Though its place in the university
was always precarious and often
directly contested by a whole array
of skeptics ranging from professors
of business to parents frustrated at
the politicization of the classroom,
the basic postulates of Cultural
Studies—the historicity of culture,
its vital role in the production and
reproduction of subjects, the idea
of culture as a site of social struggle
over values, as well as politically precious images of the future—found
their way into the bloodstream of
the humanities and social sciences
in subtle, but impacting ways. The
basic heuristic potential of culture
was effectively indisputable.
Hegeman believes that the
ground on which this consensus
was established is now beginning
to erode. She argues that the last
ten years have seen a theoretical
shift away from the centrality of
culture towards a whole host of
new universalities and truths—a
shift, in other words, away from
mediation, context, and politics and
towards immanence, texts, and ethics. In literature, this has expressed
itself in calls to a return to aesthetics and to the study of the formal
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intricacy and structure of literary
works. This is framed in the same
language used to describe market
corrections, a kind of natural equilibrium reached in the aftermath
of effervescence and bubble think;
if two decades of cultural analysis have compromised the specificity of literature, reducing it to
mere content, the time has come to
return to the classical preeminence
of form and the lucid specificity
of the literary object. In film, says
Hegeman, similar patterns have
been discerned, with calls to reactivate the simple affective pleasures
of moviegoing, to free the experience from its capture by theory,
and to recalibrate the filmic on its
own terms (i.e., away from politics,
culture, etc.).
Across the humanities, in disciplines like philosophy and theology,
she also points to the resurgence of
ethics as a symptom of registering
this turning away from culture.
The study of ethics, in philosophy
for example, has the advantage of
providing the field with a sense of
engagement or proximity to the
practical without risking the overt
(essentially Marxist) politicizations
of Cultural Studies. Where the latter invokes the indispensability of
critique to democracy, a linkage
which requires teaching students
to uncomfortably think against the
grain of their own common sense
and which leaves the discipline
(and its professors) open to charges
of brainwashing and bias, ethics
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drapes itself in the immediacy of
seemingly universal moral conundrums, questions of personalized
comportment that a classroom can
imaginatively dissect without falling into the tense space of highly
polarized political difference. The
subtext, here, is that ethics is open
and tolerant, simultaneously concrete and available to all, whereas
politics closes down discussions via
its proximity to antiquated divisions and abstractions, a universality completely at odds with the
small vital moral puzzles that actually make up our lives.
One of the most important contentions of Hegeman’s book is that
this repudiation of (politicized)
culture can be traced directly to
the disciplinary atmospherics of
the neoliberal university. The technocratic administrative culture
produced by austerity is such that
departments in the humanities and
social sciences are now regularly
called upon to demonstrate their
value in terms that can be translated into the language of economic
profit and utility. This can work to
quietly discourage the creation of
interdisciplinary departments and
projects of the kind usually proliferated by the cultural turn; the
newness and uncategorizability
of women’s studies, posthumanism, globalization studies, and
digital humanities often strike the
technocrat’s ear as mere verbiage
or outright obfuscation. Indeed,
Hegeman suggests that the new
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emphasis on aesthetics, ethics, close
reading, etc., might itself be another
of austerity’s many trickle-down
effects, in that professors worried
about job security and even the continuing existence of their faculties
are being encouraged to retrench
their disciplines around familiar,
classically intelligible objects and
methods and to produce research
results compatible with the liberal
humanist palates of administrators.
The twentieth century has seen a
remarkable dilation and expansion
of the word culture even as its signification has taken on more modest dimensions. Where culture once
evoked impressions of Napoleonic
nationalist Bildung (education), the
simultaneously open and limited
domain of struggling Hegelian
Geist (spirit), it today indicates
instead the active sameness that
subtends any group or collective
irrespective of scale or greatness.
Hockey, science, and celebrity all
have their own cultures, their own
self-reproducing metabolism or
structured repetition. According
to Hegeman, the resignification of
the word and its appearance in a
bewildering array of new contexts
has imbued it with novel pedagogical and political powers. When we
speak, for example, of a culture of
rape in sport or of the short-termist
culture of finance, we discover a
very succinct way of undercutting
the usual habit of dressing up systemic violence and error in the idiosyncratic particularity of exception:

in a flash, we are furnished with a
fully operational concept of structure, one that at the same time manages to avoid the bad old specters
of determinism and holism with
which the latter is often associated.
Hegeman thinks the concept of culture is unique precisely insofar as it
continues to conserve this capacity
to elegantly mediate “between part
and whole,” “between the universal
and the particular” (58).
Hegeman’s conception of culture
takes seriously its post-structuralist
detractors, for whom it presumes
a homogeneity and oneness constitutively inimical to difference.
She concedes culture’s internal
complexity and the fragmented or
composite quality of its oneness,
however, without triggering the
full demobilization of the word so
often proposed by those for whom
its Hegelian (originally Herderian)
echoes are too strong. She’s also
clear that it cannot be allowed
to masquerade as a quietly racist
essentialism, the kind of gesture
made by neoconservatives in their
attempt to naturalize (racialized)
poverty as an effect of entrenched
cultural habit and identity. The
culture of poverty, here, when used
to clarify racialized inequality in
America often instantly hypostatizes a whole host of middle-class
fantasies about “things black people do” (single-parenting, drugs,
etc.). These misconstruals of culture work precisely because they
have disentangled themselves from
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the self-implicating complicities of
history; they open the door to an
historical materialist insistence on
the (always constrained and dialectical) autoproduction of human
communities only to slam it shut,
re-enclosing reality via the comforting familiarity of cultural sameness and incorrigibility.
Hegeman is clear that the value
of the concept of culture is questionable if the concept is not placed
into a continual feedback loop with
the dynamics of political economy.
Rather than endlessly decrying the
putative homogenizations of globalization—the McDonaldization
of local flavors and pleasures—she
suggests we should instead—following Naomi Klein—heed the
McDonaldization of government
that subtends and proliferates the
corporatization of culture in the
first place. This is an important
point: one of the great public relations victories of neoliberalism has
been its capacity to dress itself up in
a dream coat of ontological variety
and difference. Juxtaposed with
the bad monotony and top–down
paternalism of the welfare state—
gray council housing, queues for
food stamps, the workerist feel of
unions—neoliberalism has piggybacked on the design ambience of
tech companies like Apple to mask
its own radical rejection of complexity, its insistence, time and time
again, on a one-size-fits-all model
of governance and life. This is a
governmentality, moreover, that
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has unleashed the conditions for
the complete subsumption of culture by the commodity form and
exchange relations. What needs
to be consistently kept in mind,
in other words, is that government
itself is culture, one that presides
over—even when doing so negatively via deregulation—the continuous, real-time economization
of existence.
One paradoxical advantage
of this subsumption is that it has
become increasingly impossible to
deny the interpenetration of culture
and economics long hypothesized
by the likes of Raymond Williams
and Fredric Jameson (both of
whom continuously whir around
in the background of Hegeman’s
method and style). Calls, then, to fix
or tweak the excesses of microcultures—the cultures, for example,
of Washington or medicine—apart
from an eye to their systemic
embedment in an order grounded
in commodity exchange and profit
become less and less credible. In
such a context, the translational
flexibility of culture becomes indispensable. “Culture forces us,” says
Hegeman, to think about . . . the
relationship between the worlds we
inhabit and our loftiest hopes . . . .
Very few concepts force us into
the embarrassments of recognizing the limits of our own impoverished imaginations” (17). A culture
inseparable from economics is one
that when called upon to imagine
its way out of specific or sectoral
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limits and aporias has the double
function of requiring us to simultaneously reimagine the whole
itself. It does not harbor the existential separateness it may have in
the era of Romantic nationalisms,
but it nevertheless has critically
utopian political remainders and
possibilities.
Hegeman closes her book by
reflecting on the ways the theoretical repudiation of culture
might effect indigenous rights
movements, many of which are
increasingly articulated in the
language of cultural recognition.
These projects are important and
powerful, suggests Hegeman,
precisely because they refuse
from the very beginning the easy
liberal (or classically Marxist)
opposition between culture and
economics. This is understandable for anyone familiar with the
indigenous movements in Bolivia
or Ecuador, where resistance
occurs in the context of Left statist
projects intuited by these groups
as still too close to the industrialist productivism of their liberal predecessors. Hegeman,
however, is fully aware of those
instances in which these movements themselves are still caught

up in varieties of economism or
reduced to projects of administrative (state) recognition and
inclusion. Rather than moralize
the situation from the outside,
Hegeman’s quiet objective is
simply to encourage us to pause
before we dispense entirely with
the theoretical equipment provided by the concept of culture
in all of its myriad globalized
entanglements and contexts. Her
book is a well-researched repository of twentieth-century conceptions of culture that is extremely
useful for someone looking for
the wider historical context in
which Anglo-American Cultural
Studies appeared. She makes no
claims to radical novelty or innovation, here, but instead explicitly frames her work as a modest
inducement to (and transdisciplinary survey of) the still-unexhausted resources of cultural
thinking. Understood as such,
the book should be read closely.
Andrew Pendakis is assistant professor of
theory and rhetoric at Brock University and a
research fellow at the Shanghai University of
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